Wildness Without Naturalness:  Expanding Environmental Focus in the Anthropocene

Adam Pérou Hermans, Alex Lee, and Benjamin Hale

University of Colorado, Boulder

To be presented at the International Society for Environmental Ethics (ISEE) sessions at the 2013 Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, CA

Wednesday March 27th to Sunday, March 31st, 2013

Abstract:

Climate change, human development, and the global extent of our collective human impact all suggest that we have entered the age of the Anthropocene (Crutzen 2002). Many fear that the Anthropocene heralds the end of nature. Others argue that nature will persist throughout the Anthropocene. In this paper we propose that this debate rests on a conflation between naturalness and wildness. Where naturalness is fundamentally a metaphysical category, wildness is fundamentally an inter-relational category. In other words, where naturalness demarcates boundaries between the natural and non-natural environments, wildness offers a counterpart category which captures spontaneity, push back, and many of interpersonal experiences commonly associated with nature. We suggest that while naturalness vacillates between separating humans from nature and intercalating humans with nature, wildness is best understood as a relationship of control between a person and the world. The raccoons in cities, the deer in suburban yards, the coyotes hunting our cats and dogs: all these return wildness where naturalness may have been lost. In so doing, wildness creates a space for a “new natural” in the Anthropocene. One implication of this position is that wildness offers an alternate focus for efforts of conservation, restoration, adaptation, and our fundamental relationship with nature. While the Anthropocene may indeed threaten naturalness, and even the natural world as we know it, wildness will persevere.

 

Restoration, Obligations, and the Baseline Problem

Alex Lee, Adam Hermans, Benjamin Hale

University of Colorado, Boulder

Presented at the International Society for Environmental Ethics 2012 conference, June 12-15th in Allenspark, CO

Abstract:

Ought we restore degraded nature, and if so, why? Environmental theorists often approach the problem of restoration from perspectives couched in much broader debates, particularly regarding the intrinsic value and moral status of natural entities. Unfortunately, such approaches are susceptible to concerns like the Baseline Problem, which is both a philosophical and technical issue related to identifying an appropriate restoration baseline. Recasting environmental restoration in terms of obligations instead of value or worth, however, can avoid this and other classic challenges. In this paper, we argue that obligations to restore nature follow from second-personal reasons to justify our actions. Obligations to restore and rectify damages, in particular, follow from a failure to adequately justify--either by absence, neglect, omission, or malice--actions that caused, or coalesced to cause, damage. We argue this position by demonstrating how the second-personal nature of justification both demands a reason for, and motivates a response to, degradation. 

The paper proceeds in four sections. We begin by characterizing the restoration literature. We cover several key positions, seeking to demonstrate how many rely either on the establishment of moral status or environmental value to offer a reason for restoration. We note that both moral status and the question of environmental value are problems in their own right. Following this, we introduce several key examples aimed to prime intuitions and escort the reader to the conclusion that the problem of environmental restoration is best understood within an interpersonal justificatory context. The upshot of this argument suggests that an obligation to restore can neither be completely discharged by reconstructing a natural system nor by making emendations to a person’s character. Inasmuch as restoration is fundamentally a response to previous actions, what must also be in place is independent validation and uptake from a party of experts, evaluators, and/or affected parties. 

What is Wild?

Adam Pérou Hermans

University of Colorado, Boulder

Presented at the British Animal Studies Network "Wild" conference, May 25th and 26th in Glasgow, Scotland

Abstract: 

    One might encounter a red fox hunting in an alpine meadow, a henhouse, or a city street. Are all these foxes wild? What if the fox shoes little fear of humans or is out of its natural range? Just as the loss of wilderness is a critical problem that demands our attention, so too is the loss of the "wildness" of wild animals. My paper addresses a preliminary conceptual issue to addressing this problem, namely, what qualifies as wild?

    Typically, four characteristics are associated with wildness: autonomy, naturalness, wariness, and distance. None of the four is clearly necessary for being wild, as there are circumstances where an animal loses one of the four and is either still wild or, at the very least, a borderline case of wild. Clearly, then, determining how to preserve wildness requires clarifying what qualifies as wildness in the first place. 

    I suggest that wildness is best thought of as a relationship between a human, an animal, and an environment. Where a person encounters an animal, and how much control the person has over the animal and place, jointly determine whether the animal is wild.

Restoration Ethics: The Cutthroat Truth

Alexander Lee

University of Colorado, Boulder

Poster presented at the Association for Environmental Studies and Sciences annual conference,  June 23-26, 2011, Burlington, VT

Abstract:     

    Ecological restoration aims to repair the damage, assuage the harm, rectify the wrong, and change the course of negative environmental impact. I argue that obligations regarding natural entities provide a motivating moral reason to restore nature. If we wish to use restoration to repair the damage done by human impact, we must direct our restoration efforts at the ecological identities degraded by our wrongdoing. Current efforts to reintroduce the greenback cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarki stomias) to their native streams in Colorado provide an in-depth illustration of the ethics of restoration. Reintroduction in this case largely claims success, despite a known genetic misidentification of a large portion of the project's breed stock. 

    Managers currently face a choice of whether to continue the program (and mis-introduction), or change course. Continuing to introduce genetically impure breed stock would be emblematic of restoration practices that often fail to incorporate a full understanding of the environmental problem when defining restoration goals. This example provides a lens for constructing normative criteria for critically examining restoration policy. Investigating past discourse on restoration and using the greenback reintroduction and restoration as a case-study, I demonstrate that restoration is at times obligatory and ought to be directed at repair, rather than at function, value, or character. Restoration broadly ought to prioritize the integrity of the ecological identities to which our actions are aimed, and a new approach is needed in the greenback cutthroat trout case.